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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00
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Plaintiff and Appellee,
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v.
F I L E D
Russell Eugene Bisner,
Defendant and Appellant.

November 20, 2001

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey W. Gray, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Robert L. Stott, Lana Taylor, for
plaintiff
Richard P. Mauro, Michael R. Sikora, for defendant

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice:
11
Defendant Russell Eugene Bisner ("Bisner") appeals from
convictions of murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1999), and aggravated robbery, also a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1999). We affirm,
BACKGROUND
I.

FACTS

12
On the night of January 5, 1999, sometime between 9:00
and 10:30, Bisner and his friend Derek Pearson ("Pearson")
visited Christopher Lyman ("Lyman") at Lyman's apartment to
purchase LSD. While at Lyman's apartment, Bisner told Lyman that
he was going to meet somebody later that night who owed him
"something in th[e] area" of $300. Then, as Bisner and Pearson
left Lyman's apartment, Bisner declared, "Somebody is going to
die tonight."
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Ti3
After leaving Lyman's residence, Bisner and Pearson
proceeded to tne heme of Justin Koontz ("Koontz"), where they
gathered with several other friends to "hang[] out" and
"party[]." At the party, the friends consumed alcohol and used
various illegal drugs, including marijuana and LSD. During one
of the conversations at the party, Bisner mentioned to his
friends that he was owed a $350 drug debt by Darby Golub
("Golub"). Shortly thereafter, Bisner telephoned Golub and left
him a message that the drug debt was supposed to have been paid
that day. Subsequently, at approximately 2:00 on the morning of
January 6, Golub called Koontz's house. Golub first spoke with
Koontz, and after an angry exchange then spoke with Dustin Symes
("Symes"), another of Bisner's friends attending the party.
Golub and Symes also engaged in a vehement argument about the
late nature of the calls to the respective residences. This
conversation ended with the parties agreeing to meet at a nearby
strip mall to settle the dispute.
H4
Following his conversation with Golub, Symes informed
Bisner, Koontz, and Pearson of the result of the discussion.
Anticipating a fight, the four considered but eventually decided
against taking guns with them to the strip mall. Instead, they .
quickly left in Symes's truck to meet Golub.
fS
When the friends arrived at the strip mall, Golub was
not there. Symes therefore drove his truck to a neighboring
convenience store where Koontz's mother was working and from
which the strip mall could be seen. Approximately five minutes
later, Golub arrived and parked his own truck in the parking lot
of the strip mall. Upon seeing this, Symes called, "There he
is." The four friends waiting at the convenience store then
reentered Symes's truck and drove together to the strip mall.
116
At the strip mall, Symes parked his truck approximately
twenty feet from Golub's truck. After Symes parked, Golub
stepped just outside of his truck and stood alone with an assault
rifle cradled in his arms. Bisner and his friends then exited
Symes's truck and advanced on Golub. As the group approached,
Golub backed away, neither firing his rifle nor threatening to do
so. Then, Symes, who was carrying an aluminum baseball bat,
thrust the bat at Golub, cutting his head, knocking him down, and
causing him to drop the assault rifle. Koontz followed Symes's
lead by punching Golub in the leg. Golub responded to this
attack with confusion, asking, "Why are you doing this?"
17
Having disarmed Golub, Koontz and Symes retreated to
Symes's vehicle. Meanwhile, Bisner and Pearson remained at
Golub's truck, forcing him to the ground and beating on him for
approximately thirty to forty-five seconds. At that point, Symes
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yeiLea for his friends to return to the vehicle. Pearson
complied with Sym.es' s request, and just as he, Kccntz, and Symes
were climbing into their vehicle, Golub lifted himself from the
ground and began speeding away in his truck. As Golub began to
flee, Bisner took the assault rifle from the ground, cocked it,
and fired three times at Golub. Bisner's shots missed, but as
Golub continued to speed away through the parking lot, Bisner
fired the rifle three additional times. One of those rounds
struck Golub in the back of the head and killed him.
118
Less than an hour later, at approximately 2:40 a.m.,
Sandy City Police Officer Greg Severson (''Officer Severson")
arrived at the strip mall in response to the shooting. At the
scene, Officer Severson learned from Koontz's mother, who
remained at the convenience store, that Bisner, Koontz, Pearson,
and Symes had been involved in a confrontation that ultimately
led to the shooting. Accordingly, Officer Severson proceeded to
Koontz's home, where Koontz and Pearson were taken into custody.
While at the Koontz residence, Officer Severson further learned
that Bisner had just telephoned Koontz. Using the number that
Bisner had called from, which was recorded on the Koontzes'
caller identification service, Officer Severson obtained Bisner's
address and traveled there with another Sandy City.officer and
three sheriff's deputies.
19
The police arrived at Bisner's home at approximately
5:00 a.m. They then secured the premises, called Bisner on the
telephone, and took him into custody at gunpoint after he exited
the house. With Bisner safely in custody, Officer Severson and
the Sandy City officer accompanying him holstered their weapons
and approached the house to speak with Bisner's mother. The two
officers explained that they were still looking for one suspect
involved in the shooting and asked Bisner's mother for permission
to search her home. Bisner's mother gave her permission for the
search, telling the two officers to "go ahead."
$10 Beginning their search, the two officers moved to the
basement of the house, where, Bisner's mother had informed them,
Bisner lived. Bisner's room had been created at the end of a
hallway in the basement, and was separated from the adjoining
room by a cloth that had been draped from the ceiling and hung
the length of the wall. As the officers descended the stairway
into the basement, Officer Severson observed through an opening
in this draped entry to Bisner's bedroom a shotgun and an assault
rifle resting in a gun rack on the floor of the room. In the
basement, Officer Severson also examined, but did not enter, a
doorless closet leading out of the hallway adjacent to Bisner's
room. However, seeing "just clothing" inside the closet, the
officers proceeded to search the house for Symes.

3
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311 Having cleared the house for any possible suspects,
Officer Severson determined an additional search would be
necessary due to his discovery of the two weapons in Bisner's
room. Officer Severson therefore contacted his commanding
officer and requested that a detective be sent to assist him in
the search. While Officer Severson was waiting for the detective
to arrive, he obtained a "permission to search" form from his
patrol car and requested that Bisner's mother sign it so that he
could again search her home. The form stated in pertinent part:
Knowing of my . . . CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT not
to have a search made of the premises and
property owned by me [without a search
"1'
warrant] . . . , I willingly give my
permission to the above named officer (s) to
conduct a complete search of the premises and
property, including all buildings and
vehicles, both inside and outside of the
property [referred to herein].
Bisner's mother read the permission form and signed.it at
approximately 5:30 a.m. Bisner's sister, who had been present
throughout both the search and her mother's conversations with
Officer Severson, also signed the form as a witness thereto.
112 When Detective Mark Soper ("Detective Soper") arrived
at approximately 5:35 a.m., Officer Severson advised him of the
progress of the search. Detective Soper then asked to speak
privately with Bisner's mother. During their conversation,
Detective Soper reviewed the permission to search form that she
had signed. Bisner's mother reaffirmed that she had read and
signed the form, and indicated that she did not have any
questions about its meaning. Detective Soper then verbally
requested permission to search her home, and Bisner's mother
again consented to the search. However, Bisner's mother further
advised Detective Soper that Bisner was "supposed to pay rent"
for his room but had not done so for "the last two months because
he was unemployed."
113 Upon learning of Bisner's arrangement to pay rent to
his mother for use of his room, Detective Soper determined that
he would search the house without entering the areas occupied
exclusively by Bisner until he could obtain a search warrant
allowing him to do so. Commencing his search, Detective Soper,
like Officer Severson, was able to view through an opening in the
draped entry to Bisner's room the shotgun and assault rifle
discovered there in the earlier search. Detective Soper also
examined, but did not enter, the doorless closet near Bisner's
room. Looking into the closet, Detective Soper saw various
No. 20000026
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clothing that matched a description of Bisner's a::::e from •
day of the shooting. Partially underneath some of the cicth:
Detective Scper observed the "black stock" of what "appeared
be [the mid-section of] an assault-type rifle "
(

:I14 Subsequently, at approximately 10:30 that morning,
Detective Soper obtained a duly executed search warrant
commanding a daytime search of Eisner's residence for, among
other things, M[a]ny firearms," "\[a]ny ammunition,"' "[ajny spent
shell casings," the clothes Bisner was described to have been
wearing just prior to the shooting, and n[a]ny other fruits or
instrumentalities that are evidence of the crime of criminal
homicide." Using this search warrant, Detective Soper returned
to Bisner's basement bedroom and confiscated various evidence,
including the shotgun and assault rifle seen in Bisner's room and
the assau11 rif1e in the nearby closet. Ihe assau11 rif1e
confiscated from Bisner's closet was the weapon used to kill
Golub.
4ISTORY
115 D- :-3"uar> * w x^r. -..c ^tate charged Bxsner by
information -L::* murder and aggravated robbery, both first degree
felonies. _n February 22 ! '*zj Bisner served the State with a
written request for aiscc^i,
In the inter rogatory, Bisner
n
requested prcducti~ ~f s—— j ctner "hiriq.*, *
[..is: ;: s„i witnesses the [S]tate intends
t- -ail at The preliminary .tearing, including
information regarding the details of
any cooperation agreements written or
unwritten; oetween either police officer[s]
or tne [district attorney]'s office and
potent .3 1 witnesses, including offers of
immunity, offers :f Len:en:y[,| cr :ther
incentives designed to eiint cooperation
such as :he threat T" cr-s*3 ~ut f i onl f^r the
hcmici::e as a par*
The State ar.^er-c :.n.i reques. .:a.ch 16, 1999, noting, " rhe
State has n.* yet determined i:s witnesses for the preliminary
hearing,"
:
HI6 On May 10, 1999, Bisner next requested from the State
production of a "[1 ] i st of a 1 1 witnesses the State intends to
call at trial, including
any information regarding the
detail of any written or oral cooperation agreement between any
police agency or officer, the State [,] and potential witnesses."
The State answered this request on May 18, 1999, informing Bisner
5
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!%

that i: wculd provide its list of likely witnesses
finalized."

vv

[wjhen . . .

1117 Subsequently, on May 11, 1999, Eisner moved the trial
court to "suppress all evidence found in [Bisner]'s house,
including the gun allegedly used by him in this case." According
to the motion, all of the evidence seized from Bisner's residence
was inadmissible since the search warrant Detective Soper used to
confiscate the evidence was based on information gained during
Officer Severson's "warrantless search," which violated Bisner's
Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures.
In response to this motion, the State argued that Detective
Soper's search warrant was valid and constitutional because it
was obtained only on the basis of information gathered during
searches conducted with the express consent of Bisner's mother,
who owned the home at issue.
118 On May 17, 1999, the trial court held a preliminary
hearing to consider Bisner's motion to suppress the evidence
obtained from his residence. After considering evidence on the
matter from both sides, the court denied Bisner's motion to
suppress, concluding that his mother, as owner of the house,
voluntarily consented to both of the pre-warrant searches that
yielded the information from which Detective Soper ultimately
obtained his search warrant and seized the evidence at issue. In
its subsequent findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
matter, the trial court found:
[Bisner's mother] gave her permission . . .
[for the officers] to make a cursory search
of her home to determine if any other
suspects were inside. . . . [Following this
preliminary search, Bisner's mother again]
willingly gave her permission for the police
to complete a search of her premises and
property and to take any property which they
desired as evidence.
The court therefore ruled, "From the totality of circumstances,
[Bisner's mother]'s consent to search on both occasions was given
voluntarily. . . . [Thus,] [b]oth pre-warrant searches conducted
by Officer Severson and Detective Soper were valid and lawful.
Neither violated any of the defendant's constitutional rights."
519 Thereafter, on August 19, 1999, less than a week before
trial, Bisner moved to exclude "[a]ny evidence as to a monetary
debt from a drug deal" between Bisner and Golub. In support of
thi's motion, Bisner asserted that evidence of the drug debt was
irrelevant, constituted "inadmissible character evidence"
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cursua" :: "Jtah Rule of Evidence 404(b), and was thus x:
prejudicial than probative.
120 Then, approximately three days before trial, 3:
attorney learned that Lyman might have entered into two
agreements with the prosecution for his testimony in Bisner's
trial. Specifically, after learning from the State that Lyman
would be testifying at trial,
A defense investigator contacted Lyman to
discuss his expected testimony and learned
that at the time Lyman first spoke to police
he had a pending misdemeanor charge, and that
after he gave his statement [to the police],
someone spoke to the judge on his behalf and
he got eight days off of a ten day sentence,
the dismissal of a fine[,] and "something
else,"
Bisner's attorney suspected that the "something else" referred to
by Lyman possibly included a "no prosecution" agreement from the
State on potential drug distribution charges arising out of his
sale of LSD to Bisner and Pearson. Accordingly, on the first day
of trial, August 24, 1999, Bisner moved to have the trial court
exclude the testimony of "any [Sjtate witness [for] whom the
State has not provided full disclosure of any agreements,
inducements, offers of leniency, or other understandings that the
witness would receive some benefit for cooperating or testifying"
in Bisner's trial. The basis for this motion was that by failing
to disclose any cooperation agreements it had made, the State
violated Bisner's due process rights in contradiction to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
121 After the jury had been impaneled for trial, the trial
court conducted a hearing on Bisner's motion to exclude evidence
of the drug debt Golub owed Bisner. Ruling that the drug debt
evidence was admissible to demonstrate "the purpose of th[e]
gathering that resulted in Golub's death," the trial court denied
Bisner's motion.
122 At trial, the State first called Lyman to the witness
stand. On cross-examination, Bisner's attorney questioned Lyman
at length about any incentive he received for testifying in
Bisner's trial. Bisner's attorney first asked Lyman whether he
had received "any sort of a deal" for testifying, and Lyman
responded: "No, I was not given immunity or any kind of written
statement . . . that I would not be prosecuted." Bisner's
attorney then questioned Lyman about any incentives he had

7
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received fcr giving his statement concerning the case to the
police. Lyman stated:
When I gave the statement [to the police],
there really was no agreement. They told me
[that they] couldn't promise anything . . . ,
[that] they wouldn't even be able to tell me
whether or not they could knock any time off.
I basically told [them] what I told you so
far[,] and they said they'd see what they
could do. I wasn't guaranteed anything at
the time of the statement.
However, after further questioning Lyman admitted that for giv
his statement to the police, he did eventually have to serve o
"two days [in jail] instead of ten da/s" for a misdemeanor he
committed in events unrelated to Goluc's death, and that he
"apparently" also avoided imposition of a fine for that crime.
1123 As a result of this admission, Bisner moved the tria
court to strike Lyman's testimony from the record, Bisner's
attorney argued:
The [basis] for the motion . . . to strike
the testimony of Chris Lyman [is] on due
process grounds due to an undisclosed
cooperation agreement for his testimony
. . . . [T]here is a . . . dispute as to
whether there was any deal in this case. The
Prosecutor has indicated to me that there was
none. The evidence elicited from Chris Lyman
himself was that there was none. [But i]t is
my view that his testimony indicates a de
facto deal.

Mr. Lyman agreed that he stated to my
investigator that there was [a] . . . jail
sentence that he got help on, a fine, and
something else . . . .
[And] I believe that
. . . Mr. Lyman was told, perhaps through
counsel, that he would not be prosecuted for
certain admitted drug distribution charges
[arising from his sale of LSD to Bisner and
Pearson], which would be second degree
felonies.

No. 20000026

8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Stale then responded to this argument, attesting that ic - a d
not abstained from prosecuting Lyman in exchange for his
testimony:
Yes, LMr. Lyman's attorney was concerned [that
Lyman would be prosecuted for drug
distribution based on his testimony at
trial]. I told him simply that because we
. . . had no . . . corpus of this crime, we
wouldn't be able to prosecute his client
because we had no evidence other than his
statements that there was a crime committed.
So there was no inducement. I didn't promise
him I wouldn't prosecute him for his
testimony. I just told him a simple fact[:]
I couldn't prosecute him.
After considering this evidence, the trial court denied Bisner's
motion to strike Lyman's testimony. Finding that Bisner's
attorney knew of any potential agreement between Lyman and the
authorities involved in his unrelated misdemeanor charge prior to
trial—and that it was "quite clear" Lyman had not received "an
inducement encouraging him to testify" from the State—the court
concluded, "I am just not persuaded that there has been a [due
process] violation [in this case] . . . ." The court therefore
also denied a motion for directed verdict Bisner had made on the
basis that without Lyman's testimony, the State could only prove
Bisner had committed manslaughter and not murder because intent
could not be established.
524 Bisner then rested without presenting evidence, and the
jury was sent out. Following its deliberations, the jury found
Bisner guilty of both murder and aggravated robbery. The jury
further found that Bisner had used a dangerous weapon in the
commission of Golub's murder.
525 Subsequently, on September 14, 1999, Bisner moved the
trial court to merge his aggravated robbery and murder
convictions. To support this motion, Bisner argued that despite
this court's holding to the contrary in State v. McCovey, 803
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990), "aggravated robbery is a lesser included
offense of murder," and thus, he could not "be convicted of both
offenses" pursuant to section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah Code.
Relying on McCovey, the court denied Bisner's motion.
526 Thereafter, on October 1, 1999, the trial court
sentenced Bisner to an indeterminate prison term of not less than
five years for murder and not less than five years for aggravated
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robbery, with a one-year dangerous firearm enhancement in the
commission of murder, all sentences running consecutively.
127 Following his sentencing, Bisner moved for a new trial
on the ground that the State violated his due process rights by
"failfing] to disclose a cooperation agreement for Chris Lyman
. . . in which the State agreed not to prosecute Lyman for drug
distribution charges." The court denied Eisner's motion for a
new trial in a ruling dated November 23, 1999.
128 Accordingly, on December 1, 1999, Bisner moved the
trial court to reconsider his motion for a new trial pursuant to"*
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 24. To support this motion,
Bisner argued first that his previous motion "was denied without
the hearing requested," and second, that he subsequently
"obtained new evidence that the State also failed to disclose
cooperation agreements" with Koontz and Pearson.
529 However, before the trial court could rule on Bisner's
motion to reconsider, he appealed his conviction on December 30,
1999. Then, attempting to obtain a ruling on his motion to
reconsider, Bisn.er moved to have his appeal dismissed without
prejudice, and we denied his motion in an order dated August 31,
2000:
Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal
without prejudice while the trial court
considers defendant's motion to reconsider
. . . is denied. . . . Dismissal of this
appeal would necessarily be with prejudice,
resulting in loss of defendant's appeal. The
trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider
anything further in this case because
defendant timely filed his notice of appeal
on December 30, 1999.
Consequently, Bisner's appeal of his conviction is now before us.
ANALYSIS
130 On appeal, Bisner raises numerous claims of error:
(1) that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial,
since the State violated Bisner's due process rights by failing
to disclose its alleged cooperation agreements with Koontz,
Lyman, Pearson, and Symes; (2) that the court committed
reversible error by failing to exclude from evidence all
information obtained pursuant to Detective Soper's search
warrant, which Bisner contends was gained "in violation of the
Fourth Amendment"; (3) that the court erred by refusing to
No. 20000026
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exclude eviaer.ee of the drug debt Golub owed Bisner; (4) that the
court misled the jury by giving a "confusing" instruction
concerning the necessity of convicting Bisner of manslaughter
rather than murder if he was found to have been acting "under an
extreme emotional disturbance"; and (5) that the trial court
should have merged his charges for aggravated robbery and murder.
We address each issue in turn.
I.

DUE PROCESS

H31 Bisner first contends that by failing to disclose
alleged cooperation agreements it entered into with Koontz,
Lyman, Pearson, and Symes, the State violated his due process
right to a fair trial, and thus, the trial court should have
granted his motion for a new trial made on that basis. "When
reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, we
will not reverse 'absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial
court.'" State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 5 12, 994 P.2d 177
(quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998)); see
also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, 1 28, 979 P.2d 799; State v.
Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1992). At the same time,
however, we review the legal standards applied by the trial court
in denying such a motion for correctness. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at
1 28; see also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991).
1132 Under both the Utah and United States Constitutions,
the prosecution bears a "fundamental'' duty "to disclose material,
exculpatory evidence to the defense" in criminal cases. Bakalov,
1999 UT 45 at 1 30. This duty, enunciated first by the United
States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963), arises regardless of whether the defense requests
production of the favorable evidence at issue, United States v.
Baaley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985), since failure to disclose such
evidence "violates due process . . . irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
Likewise, the duty applies both to substantively exculpatory
evidence and to that which may be used for impeachment. Baaley,
473 U.S. at 676; Gialio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55
(1972); Bakalov, 1999 UT 45 at f 30.
133 Despite the strictures imposed on prosecutors by this
constitutional duty of disclosure, the United States Supreme
Court has held that it is in the specific instance where there is
"discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to
the prosecution but unknown to the defense" that reversal of a
conviction for nondisclosure is required. United States v.
Aaurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (emphasis added); see also Baalev,
473 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, courts universally refuse to
overturn convictions where the evidence at issue is known to the
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defense prior ~o or during trial, where the defendant reasonably
should have known of the evidence, or where the defense had the
opportunity to use the evidence to its advantage during trial but
failed to do so.1 As the Sixth Circuit held in United States v.
Mull ins,

1

See, e.g., United States v. Wadlincton, 233 F.3d 1067,
1076 (8th Cir. 2000) (refusing to find a Brady violation where
the defendant "was already aware of the substance of the
[undisclosed] statements prior to trial"); United States v.
—
Quintanilla, 193 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
defendant's "independent awareness of the exculpatory evidence is
critical" because "[i]f a defendant already has a particular
piece of evidence/' production by the prosecution "is considered
cumulative"); Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding that evidence is not suppressed if the defendant
"knew, or should have known of the essential facts permitting him
to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence"); United States v.
Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 919 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim of a
Brady violation because the defendant "was . . . aware that [a
witness's] cooperation may have warranted some additional
investigation"); United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th
Cir. 1991) ("When . . . a defendant has enough information to be
able to ascertain the supposed Brady material on his own, there
is no suppression by the government."); United States v. Perdomo,
929 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991) (employing the Rector standard);
United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1991) (using
the Mullins standard); United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 380
(4th Cir. 1990) (following the Eleventh Circuit's approach in
Davis); United States v. Pandozzi, 878 F.2d 1526, 1528 (1st Cir.
1989) (finding no Brady violation where defense could have
obtained the information "'with any reasonable diligence'"
(quoting Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1258 (11th Cir.
1984)); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Brady . . . does not mandate pretrial disclosure. Instead,
'the appropriate standard to be applied . . . is whether the
disclosure came so late as to prevent the defendant from
receiving a fair trial.'" (citations omitted)); United States v.
Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he Bradv rule
does not apply if the evidence in question is available to the
defendant from other sources."); Xydas v. United States, 445 F.2d
660, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that the prosecution's failure
"to disclose the contested grand jury statement was not
reversible error, since under the circumstances . . . reasonable
pre-trial preparation by the defense would either have confirmed,
denied, or rendered immaterial" the evidence in dispute).

No. 20000026

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

:Tjhe government's failure to disclose
potentially exculpatory information does not
violate Brady "where a defendant 'knew or
should have known the essential facts
permitting him to take advantage of any
exculpatory information,' or where the
evidence is available to defendant from
another source."
22 F.3d 1365, 1371 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States
v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1988))). Indeed, any
mandate to the contrary would belie the fundamental objective of
the prosecution's duty to disclose, for the purpose of this
requirement is to ensure a fair trial. The United States Supreme
Court has itself observed: "[The] purpose [of the Brady rule] is
not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by
which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of
justice does not occur. Thus, the prosecutor is not required to
deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose
evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would
deprive the defendant of a fair trial [.]" Baoley, 473 U.S. at
675 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. LeRoy, 687
F.2d 610, 619 (2d Cir. 1982). In short, a Brady violation occurs
only where the state suppresses information that (1) remains
unknown to the defense both before and throughout trial and
(2) is material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would
have created a "reasonable probability" that "the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Baaley, 473 U.S. at 682.
134 In this case, Bisner contends that the State committed
multiple due process violations in contravention to the Brady
rule, requiring us to overturn his convictions on appeal.
Specifically, Bisner argues that the State failed to disclose
cooperation agreements it allegedly entered into with a number of
its witnesses, including Lyman, and also Koontz, Pearson, and
Symes.
A.

Nondisclosure of the Alleged Agreement with Lyman

135 Bisner asserts that the State failed to disclose two
separate incentives it allegedly provided to Lyman for testifying
in Bisner's trial: first, a reduction in the jail time Lyman was
required to serve and the fine he was ordered to pay for an
unrelated misdemeanor he committed, and second, a "promise not to
prosecute" Lyman for selling Bisner and Pearson LSD on the night
of Golub's death. According to Bisner, the State's failure to
disclose these alleged incentives "is reversible error."
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7L3S However, as explained above, prosecutorial
nondisclosure of information favorable to the accused does net by
itself constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal of a
conviction. See, e.g., Baaley. 473 U.S. at 675; LeRoy, 687 F.2d
at 619. Rather, nondisclosure violates due process under Brady
only if the evidence at issue is material and exculpatory, and if
the defense did not become aware of the evidence until after
trial. See Baaley, 473 U.S. at 678; Aaurs, 427 U.S. at 103;
Mullins, 22 F.3d at 1371; see also supra note 1. Accordingly,
even assuming that the cooperation agreements alleged here by
Bisner actually existed—and observing that their substance would
qualify by definition as Brady material for its impeachment
value, see Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55—the State's nondisclosure
of such evidence necessitates reversal only upon a determination
that the defense was never afforded an opportunity to impeach
Lyman with the information because the defense did not become
aware of it until after Bisner's trial ended.

137 Importantly, there is no question in this case that the
defense knew days before trial about the State's alleged
agreement to reduce the jail sentence and fine imposed in Lyman's
unrelated misdemeanor in exchange for his testimony in Bisner's
trial. The defense itself admitted in its motion for a new
trial:
A few days prior to trial, . . . [a] defense
investigator contacted Lyman to discuss his
expected testimony and learned that at the
time Lyman first spoke to police he had a
pending misdemeanor charge, and that after he
gave his statement [to the police], someone
spoke to the judge on his behalf and he got
eight days off of a ten day sentence, the
dismissal of a fine[,] and "something else."
Indeed, it was because he was aware of the possibility of this
agreement with Lyman that Bisner's attorney was able to use this
information extensively at trial in an attempt to impeach Lyman's
testimony. Bisner's attorney asked Lyman whether he received
"any sort of deal for . . . giving th[e] information" about what
Bisner had said to him earlier that night, whether he had
"talk[ed] [with the police] about getting out of some jail time
if [he would] cooperate," and whether it was his "understanding
that if [he] cooperate[d] and g[a]ve a statement to the police[,]
that [he] would not have to serve . . . eight [additional] days"
in jail. In fact, Lyman conceded during this questioning that he
had received a reduction in his sentence, stating that he had to
serve only "two days [in jail] instead of ten" and that he
"apparently" also avoided an imposition of a fine for his
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".Teissier* :: the misdemeanor. As a consequence, Bisr.er' s :.a:r.
that: his due process rights were violated by the State's failure
to disclose this alleged agreement with Lyman is wholly without
merit. Not only does the defense admit that it knew about this
alleged agreement days before trial, but Bisner's attorney
actually used the information for the precise purpose the
Constitution requires its disclosure: impeachment. See Gialio,
405 U.S. at 154-55. Therefore, the State's nondisclosure of its
alleged agreement to seek a reduction in Lyman's misdemeanor
sentence in exchange for his testimony does not constitute a
Brady violation. See Mullins, 22 F.3d at 1371; Grossman, 943
F.2d at 85; see also, e.g., United States v. Grinties, 237 F.3d
876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Bradv applies only where the allegedly
exculpatory evidence was not disclosed in time for the defendant
to make use of it."); United States v. Adams, 834 F.2d 632, 63435 (7th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d
1131, 1141 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendants' due
process rights were not violated by the nondisclosure of evidence
because the defense used the same evidence to impeach the
witnesses at issue during trial) .
138 Likewise, Bisner has no claim that the State's failure
to disclose its alleged promise not to prosecute Lyman for drug
distribution violated his right to a fair trial. While the
record does not reflect the precise moment at which the defense
became aware of this alleged promise, it is clear that the
defense knew about the possibility of the inducement well before
the trial concluded—at the very least, by the end of the State's
case in chief. In the hearing on his motion to strike Lyman's
testimony, held just after the State examined its last witness,
Bisner's attorney specifically alleged it was his "view that
[Lyman's] testimony indicates a de facto deal" on the State's
part not to prosecute Lyman for drug distribution. Bisner's
attorney stated further, "I believe that . . . Mr. Lyman was
told, perhaps through counsel, that he would not be prosecuted
for certain admitted drug distribution charges . . . ." In
response, counsel for the State acknowledged that he had told
Lyman's attorney that the State "wouldn't be able to prosecute
[Lyman] because [the State] had no evidence other than his
statements that there was a crime committed." However, despite
the State's acknowledgment in this regard—and despite Bisner's
assertion that Lyman had received a "de facto deal" of
nonprosecution in exchange for his testimony—the defense utterly
failed to make use of this knowledge during trial. Following the
hearing on his motion to strike Lyman's testimony, Bisner could
have recalled Lyman as a witness to question him specifically
about the nature of the alleged "de facto deal" guaranteeing that
the State would not prosecute him for drug distribution. Bisner
similarly could have sought a continuance or recess in order to
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rut the defense did not capitalize en either of these
possibilities. Instead, when asked by the trial court whether it
wished to call any witnesses, the defense declined, noting that
it was ''satisfied with the state of the evidence.'' Consequently,
we. hold that because the defense was afforded a full opportunity
"to make use of the . . . disclosed information," but failed to
do so, the State's nondisclosure of its alleged promise not to
prosecute Lyman did not violate Bisner's due process rights.
Adams, 334 F.2d at 635; see also Grinties, 237 F.3d at 330
(holding that no Brady violation occurred where the defendant
failed to use the allegedly exculpatory information disclosed
during trial); Muliins, 22 F.3d at 1371-72 (finding no Brady
violation where information "was known" by the defendant "in time
for him to attempt to make use of it")-; United States v. Ramirez,
310 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1987) (same).'
3. Nondisclosure of the Alleged
Agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Svmes
139 Bisner also claims that the State violated his due
process rights under Bradv by failing to disclose leniency
agreements it allegedly entered into with Koontz, Pearson, and
Symes concerning the charges they faced for their actions in the
events leading to Golub's death. However, Bisner failed to
properly preserve this claim at the trial level, and thus waived
his right to raise the issue on appeal. While Bisner did move
for a new trial on the basis that the State had failed to
disclose the inducements it allegedly offered Lyman for his
testimony, Bisner never properly raised before the trial court
his assertion, made now on appeal, that the State also failed to
disclose cooperation agreements it allegedly entered into with
Koontz, Pearson, and Symes. Indeed, the only time Bisner ever
brought the issue of the alleged agreements with Koontz and
Pearson before the trial court was in his December 1, 1999,
motion requesting that the court reconsider its decision denying
his initial motion for a new trial. Significantly, the trial
court never ruled on this motion to reconsider, as Bisner filed
his notice of appeal on Deceniber 30, 1999, divesting jurisdicticn
from the trial court. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v.
Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1996) (holding that
filing notice of appeal "divests the trial court of jurisdiction
and transfers it to the appellate court''); see also Cheves v.
Williams, 1999 UT 86, i 45, 993 P.2d 191; White v. State, 795
P.2d 643, 650 (Utah 1990). In fact, we have already ruled in
this case that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider
Bisner's motion to reconsider since Bisner filed notice of appeal
before the trial court could enter a final order on the issue.
See suora % 29 ("Defendant's motion to dismiss this appeal
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•vimcur prejudice while the trial court ccnsiders oefer.iar.t' s
action to reconsider . . . 13 denied. . . . The trial court
iac!<s jurisdiction to consider anything further in tnis case
because defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on
December 30, 1999."). Similarly, Bisner did not argue even once
to the trial court that the State had failed to disclose a
cooperation agreement with Symes.2 Accordingly, because Bisner
failed to preserve the issue below, he cannot now claim that the
State violated his due process rights by failing to disclose
alleged leniency agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes. See
State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74, 1 11, 10 P.3d 346 P[C]laims not
raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal. . . .
[This] preservation rule applies to every claim, including
constitutional questions . . . . " ) ; Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d
1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (holding that constitutional claims not
raised in the district court are deemed to be waived)/ see also
State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 29, 974 P.2d 269; State v. Locez,
336 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994).
1140 Moreover, even if Bisner did not waive his right to
raise the issue on appeal, the State's nondisclosure of its
alleged leniency agreements with Koontz, Pearson, and Symes did
not violate Brady. As with the inducements allegedly promised to
Lyman, the State's alleged leniency agreements with Koontz,
Pearson, and Symes fall within Brady's purview solely for their
impeachment value. See Gialio, 405 U.S. at 154-55. However,
both Koontz and Pearson admitted at trial that they had pled
guilty to reduced misdemeanor charges despite the fact that they
had initially been charged with felonies, and Symes testified at
Bisner's preliminary hearing that the State would inform his
sentencing judge that he had testified cooperatively in Bisner's

2

In fact, even Bisner's December 1, 1999, motion to
reconsider addressed only the testimony of Lyman, Koontz, and
Pearson. Yet two months after Bisner filed his motion to
reconsider, he submitted to the trial court a document entitled
''supplement to record of motion for new trial," which included a
transcript of Symes's sentencing hearing that Bisner now relies
on in support of his argument that Symes entered into a leniency
agreement with the State. However, at no point in this
''supplement" does Bisner ever assert that the alleged agreement
between Symes and the State violated his due process rights.
Instead, as explained above, Bisner so argues for the first time
on appeal. See supra 1 39. Further, Bisner submitted this
"supplement" to the trial court on February 1, 2000—more than a
month after he filed his notice of appeal on December 30, 1999,
and thus well after the trial court had been divested of
jurisdiction to consider the matter. See supra 1 39.
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rase. Specifically, Koontz acknowledged chat he had been charcec
with "murder" but "ended up pleading to attempted rioting, class
A, and a class 3 assault." Pearson likewise testified that he
had been charged with "felony riot" but "pled guilty to . . . a
"class 3 and a class A . . . attempted riot and simple assault."
And Symes testified that the State had agreed to "[i]nfcrm the
court cf my testimony and [that] I was cooperative" following his
appearance as a witness in Bisner's case- Accordingly, because
the necessary information from which the credibility of their
testimony could be questioned actually came out at trial and
before, the State cannot be said to have withheld exculpatory
information. The defense could have further exposed any
'r
potential leniency agreements with the smallest amount of
"reasonable diligence" by simply asking Koontz and Pearson why
their charges had been reduced, and Symes had already disclosed
the nature of his agreement with the State in the presence of
Bisner's attorney and while under oath. See United States v.
Campaanuolo, 592 F.2d 852, 361 (5th Cir. 1979); see also, e.g.,
Grinties, 237 F.3d at 880; Jarrell v. Balkcom. 735 F.2d 1242,
1258 (11th Cir. 1984). Given these circumstances, the defense
reasonably should have known of the possibility of the alleged
agreements, as Bisner's attorney possessed the "essential facts
permitting [Bisner] to take advantage of any exculpatory
evidence" related to Koontz's, Pearson's, and Symes's testimony.
Rector, 120 F.3d at 560. Thus, no Brady violation could have
occurred. See United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 919 (2d Cir.
1993) (rejecting a claim of a Brady violation because the
defendant "was . . . aware that [a witness's] cooperation may
have warranted some additional investigation"); United States v.
Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1991) ("When . . . a
defendant has enough information to be able to ascertain the
supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by
the government."); see also, e.g., United States v. Perdomo, 929
F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991); LeRoy. 687 F.2d at 618.3

3

Bisner also urges that the State's failure to disclose its
alleged cooperation agreements with Koontz, Lyman, Pearson, and
Symes violated his constitutional right to confront these
witnesses and his discovery rights pursuant to Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(a). However, Bisner did not lodge these
arguments before the trial court. Thus, he has waived his right
to raise them on appeal. See State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74, 1 11,
10 P.3d 346; State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, 1 29, 974 P.2d 269;
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v.
Locez, 386 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994).
No. 20000026
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II.

CONSENT TO SEARCH

541 3isner's second contention en appeal is that the trial
rourt erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence
removed from his living quarters in his mother's basement,
namely, the assault rifle used to kill Golub. Bisner premises
this contention on the argument that the warrant employed to
confiscate the assault rifle was ineffective because the
information used to secure the warrant was obtained
unconstitutionally. Specifically, Bisner asserts (1) that his
mother did not give Officer Severson "voluntary consent to
conduct [the] . . . search" of her home immediately following
Bisner's arrest, and (2) that the subsequent search conducted by
Detective Soper also was unconstitutional since the written
consent given by Bisner's mother was involuntary, as it "was
obtained by exploiting the prior unlawful, warrantless search."
142 The question of whether a par-y has consented to a
search is a question of law, and we th^.efore review it for
correctness. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995);
see also Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah
1990). Conversely, we will reverse the trial court's factual
findings only if they are clearly erroneous. Harmon, 910 P.2d at
1199; see also State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990).
In determining whether a trial court's factual findings are
clearly erroneous, we reject those findings that are not
"supported by substantial, competent evidence." Arroyo, 796 P.2d
at 687.
A.

Applicable Law

143 Warrantless searches are per se unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment unless conducted pursuant to a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 353 (1967); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah
1992). One such exception includes searches conducted pursuant
to consent. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982);
State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175, 179 (Utah 1983). However, for a
consent search to be valid, consent must have been given
voluntarily and not have been "obtained by police exploitation of
. . . prior illegality." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262
(Utah 1993) .
544 In support of his contention that his mother did not
voluntarily consent to Officer Severson's initial search of her
house, Bisner urges that consent is voluntary only if
"(1) [t]here [is] clear and positive
testimony that the consent was 'unequivocal
19
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ana specific' and 'freely and intelligently
given'; (2) the government . . . prove[s]
consent was given without duress or coercion,
express or implied; and (3) . . . there [is]
convincing evidence that [the party] waived
[its constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures],"
State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citations
emitted). This test for determining.voluntariness was adopted by
the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 830,
337-39 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and has been applied.in myriad of
that court's cases over the past decade.4 While this test
correctly requires absence of duress or coercion for consent to
be deemed voluntary, it also mandates a showing that the
consenting party affirmatively waived its constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. See Ham, 910 P.2d at
439. In fact, in adopting this test the court of appeals
expressly relied on the Tenth Circuit's decision in Villano v.
United States, 310 F.2d 680, 684 (10th Cir. 1962), which also
"c
required affirmative waiver for consent to be voluntary.
1145 However, eleven years after the Tenth Circuit handed
down Villano, the United States Supreme Court flatly rejected the
requirement that the prosecution establish waiver in order to
demonstrate voluntariness. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the
Court held: "Nothing, either in the purposes behind requiring a
'knowing' and 'intelligent' waiver of trial rights, or in the
practical application of such a requirement suggests that it
ought to be extended to the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures," 412 U.S. 213, 241 (1973).
Consequently, the Court ruled that voluntariness must be
determined, not from a demonstration of waiver, but from "the
totality of all the circumstances." Id. at 227.
146 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit has since abandoned the Villano
test. S^e United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.
1991) ("In light of the Schneckloth decision, we . . . find . . .
the Villano test's application of the presumption against waiver
improper."). Likewise, this court has itself repeatedly followed

4

See, e.g.. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, M 18-25, 17
P.3d 1135; Ham, 910 P.2d at 439; State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547,
551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 467
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992);
State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Stercer, 308 P.2d 122, 127 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
No. 20000026
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the Sohr.eckloth "totality of all the circumstances'' analysis
:r.
lieu of any potential waiver test. See, e.g., Harmon. 910 ?.2i
at 1206; State v. Dunn, 350 p.2d 1201, 1217-13 (Utah 1993);
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1262-63; Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 639. Indeed,
this court must follow Schneckloth/s interpretation of consent
under the Fourth Amendment, for the United States Supreme Court
has been vested with final authority in interpreting the federal
Constitution since the inception of our republic.5 See U.S.
Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1; Marburv v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
547 Accordingly, to the degree it hinges consent upon
waiver--and to the extent our prior cases have not made our
position perfectly clear—we today explicitly reject the court of
appeals' voluntariness test as enunciated in Marshall and its
progeny. When assessing whether consent to a warrantless search
was given voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same
analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schneckloth: Consent
is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied," Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227; see
also,
e.g..
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206/ State v. Whittenback, 621
P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Factors indicating a lack of duress
or coercion, which should be assessed in the "totality of all the
surrounding circumstances/' include
1) the absence of a claim of authority to
search by the officers; 2) the absence of an
exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a
mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the
owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence

5

In addition to his claim that the searches at issue
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, Bisner claims that the searches also constituted
violations of his rights pursuant to article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution. However, Bisner neither proffers any
explanation as to how this court's analysis should be conducted
under this section nor cites even one case in support of this
argument. We have repeatedly reminded that this court "'is not
simply a depository in which the appealing party may dump the
burden of argument and research."' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439, 450 (Utah 1988) (quoting Williamson v. Oosahl, 416 N.E.2d
7
33, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981)); see also MacKav v. Hardv, 973
P.2d 941, 948 n.9 (Utah 1998). Accordingly, we decline to
address this claim separately. State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, 1 12
n.3, 999 P.2d 7.
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officer.
Whitter.hack. 621 P.2d at 106; see also Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206.
3.

Consent for Officer Severson's Search

^4 3 Applying these factors to the case at hand, we new turn
to the question of whether Bisner's mother voluntarily consented
to Officer Severson's search. Bisner asserts that the police
coerced his mother's consent to this search by making a "shew of
authority" and an "exhibition of force," which in turn
transformed their petition to search her house into "more than a
'mere request' to search." Specifically, Bisner argues that the
police exhibited force and showed authority by having "several
uniformed officers" present during Bisner's'arrest, by
"physical[ly] touching" Bisner and drawing their weapons while
taking him into custody, by stepping "inside the front door [of
the house] before asking permission to search," and by telling
3isner's mother and sisters to stay in their kitchen while
.„...
Officer Severson searched the house.
1149 Despite Bisner's contention to the contrary, however,
the officers' actions directed at him during his arrest are
wholly irrelevant to whether the officers exhibited force toward
his mother. While we do review the totality of the circumstances
in assessing whether the officers used duress or coercion to
obtain consent to search, that examination is limited to whether
duress or coercion was exerted on the person who consented to the
search, Bisner's mother, not to an entirely separate person,
3isner. See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206-08; Thurman. 846 P.2d at
1262-63. Moreover, Bisner does not challenge the trial court's
factual findings in respect to the search, and those findings
indicate that the officers did not exhibit force against Bisner's
mother during her son's arrest: The officers telephoned Bisner
from outside the house, requesting that he come outside and
surrender himself, which he did. When Bisner exited the house,
the officers had their weapons drawn, but they were pointed at
3isner, not at his mother. Indeed, Bisner's mother remained in
her house throughout Bisner's arrest. And when Officer Severson
and his assisting officer approached the house, their guns were
holstered, where they remained throughout the officers'
discussion with Bisner's mother.
150 Similarly, there is no indication that the officers'
possible stepping inside the house's front door constituted a
"show of authority" as Bisner contends. In support of this
argument, Bisner relies entirely on Officer Severson's statement
that he "was just inside the door" when he asked Bisner's mother
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::r :.er rorsent to search. However, 3isner takes this statement
cut of context in order to assert that Officer Severson entered
the house intending to search before asking permission to do so.
In fact, Officer Severson repeatedly characterized the discussion
he had with Bisner's mother as occurring "at the door7' of the
house. When asked where their discussion took place, Officer
Severson stated, "We were at the door.'' He also averred that
their discussion occurred "on the front of the step" of the house
and "on the porch." Indeed, when stating that their discussion
may have gone on inside the house, Officer Severson testified
that he "d[id]n't remember if [he] was inside" the house, but
that "if [he] was inside, [he] was just inside the. door"--a
conclusion entirely in conformity with his other statements that
the discussion occurred "at the door." Importantly, these
statements amply support the trial court's factual finding that
Officer Severson merely "spoke to [Bisner's mother,] who
identified herself as the home owner," in an effort to tell her
that "he wanted to make a cursory search of her home," not that
he barged into her home without permission as Bisner implies.
1151 Finally, the record does not support Bisner's argument
that the "police used 'commanding language'" by "ordering [his]
family to stay in the kitchen during [Officer Severson's]
search." Although Officer Severson testified that he and his
accompanying officer "had all of the family members stay up in
the kitchen and living room area," nothing in his testimony
indicates that he "commanded'' or "ordered" them to do so.
Rather, the only testimony Bisner cites in support of this
contention is his mother's. But she simply stated that she had
asked the police' if she could accompany them on their search,
since she was afraid their presence would "frighten [her] mother
[who was] in bed." When the officers declined her request, she
opened the door to her mother's bedroom and stated, "[M]om, stay
calm. Just stay in bed. . . . [T]he police are here."
Subsequently, the police "told [her] to go back in the kitchen."
Again, nothing in these statements indicates that Officer
Severson "commanded" or "ordered" Bisner's family members to
remain in their kitchen in an effort to coerce Bisner's mother
into consenting to the search. To the contrary, Officer Severson
specifically testified that Bisner's mother had told the officers
to "go ahead" with their search. Moreover, the statements of
both Officer Severson and Bisner's mother in regard to the
officers' instructions that the family should stay in the kitchen
reflect, not the officers' use of authority and force, but their
desire to protect Bisner's family, as the officers "believed that
three [suspects] were in custody [but that] one was still
outstanding" and may have been inside the house.

23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mo. 20000026

Zzl
Therefore, having examined -he recorn m ::.e ciiali-y
of the circumstances, we conclude chat the trial court properly
found the police officers made no showing of force or authority,
but merely requested permission to search. See Whittenback, 621
?.2d at 106. As a result, we hold that Bisner's mother
voluntarily consented to Officer Severscn's search of her home.
See Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1203.
C.

Consent for Detective Sooer's Search

K53 Bisner also argues that the written consent from
Bisner's mother for Detective Soper's subsequent search of the
house was given involuntarily.. However, Bisner does not argue
that the police exercised duress or coercion in securing this
consent, only that it "was obtained by exploiting the prior
unlawful, warrantless search.'' While Bisner correctly states
that consent obtained "by exploitation of . . . prior police
illegality" may be deemed involuntary under certain conditions,
e.g., State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), we have
already determined in this case that the search by Officer
Severson was entirely proper and legal. See supra 11 48-52.
Consequently, we find Bisner's argument that the consent for
Detective Soper's search was given involuntarily to be without
merit, and thus, hold that the trial court did not err in denying
his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his living
quarters in his mother's basement,
III.

PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE

154 Bisner's third contention on appeal is that the trial
court erred by denying his motion to exclude evidence of the drug
debt Golub owed him. We review a trial court's decision to admit
evidence of prior crimes or other bad acts under an abuse of
discretion standard. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 1 42, 23
P.3d 1278; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1 18, 993 P.2d 837,
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000). "However, in the proper
exercise of that discretion, trial judges must 'scrupulously'
examine the evidence before it is admitted." Widdison, 2001 UT
60 at 1 42 (quoting Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1 13).
155 Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits admission of
"[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts" if offered "to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith." Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence, however, is
admissible to prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident'' so
long as it is also relevant and more probative than prejudicial.
Id.; see Utah R. Evid. 402, 403. Accordingly, when deeming
evidence of prior bad acts admissible, the trial court must first
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determine "hat -he evidence is being offered fcr a prccer,
noncharacter purpose under one of rule 404(b)'s listed
exceptions; that it "'tends to prove seme fact that is material
to the crime charged . . . other than the defendant's propensity
to commit crime'"; and that the evidence's procativeness in this
regard is not substantially outweighed by its pre]udicial impact.
State v. Melson-Waqqoner, 2000 UT 59, f 26, 6 P.3d 1120 (quoting
Decorso, 1999 rJT 57 at 1 22); see also State v. Mead, 2001 UT 53,
15 61-64, 27 P.3d 1115; Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at M 20-23; Utah R.
Evid. 402, 403, 404(b).
156 In this case, Bisner argues that evidence of Golub's
drug debt to him "was not relevant because the shooting and
confrontation [at the strip mall] were unrelated to any alleged
drug deal." Therefore, Bisner contends, evidence of the drug
debt was inadmissible because* it could only prove his propensity
to commit crime, and was thus "unfairly prejudicial, confusing[,j
and misleading." Conversely, the State advanced the position at
trial that the drug debt owed by Golub provided Bisner with the
motive and intent to assault and kill Golub. In support of this
theory, the State questioned Lyman about his meeting with Bisner
just prior to Golub's death, and the following colloquy occurred:
Q:

What else was said by Mr. Bisner?

A: He mentioned that someone owed him a
small amount of money/ $300, something in
that area, and that they were going to be
meeting with this individual that night.
Q:

He say anything else about that?

A: Yeah . . . , kind of on the way out he
said, "Somebody is going to die tonight"
In addition to Lyman's testimony, Pearson and Symes stated at
trial that Bisner had informed his friends at the party that
Golub owed him $350 for drugs. Bisner moved the trial court to
exclude this evidence, but the court ruled that it was admissible
to demonstrate "the purpose of th[e] gathering that resulted in
Golub's death."
H57 We agree with the trial court that the evidence of the
drug debt between Bisner and Golub was admissible under rule
404(b). There was no question in this case about Bisner's
identity or acts. The only question for the jury was whether
Bisner killed Golub intentionally or, as the defense asserted,
was instead acting "under an extreme emotional disturbance"
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:i-se: cv r.is crug use earlier in the evenina. Evidence :f tr.e
drug cect therefore was not introduced to establish Bisner's
propensity to commit crime, but was admissible for the
noncharacter purpose of proving his motive and intent in killing
Golub. See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 134", 1351-52 (Utah 193"*'.
'553 Similarly, evidence of the drug debt was relevant as to
motive and intent. Evidence is relevant under 404(b) if it
xx
'tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime
charged.'" Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59 at f 26 (quoting Decorso,
1999 UT 57 at 1 22). Here, Lyman's testimony, particularly when
buttressed by the testimony of Pearson and Symes, tended to prove
the material fact of Bisner's motive by presenting the jury with
a reason Bisner had to kill Golub, thus making "more plausible
. . . the State's theory that he did s'o intentionally rather
than" under a drug-induced emotional disturbance. Pearson, 94 3
P.2d at 1351; see also Mead, 2001 UT 58 at f 63; Nelson-Waggoner,
2000 UT 59 at 1 27.
159 Finally, the probative value of the drug debt evidence
was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. As
explained above, evidence of Golub's drug debt to Bisner was
highly probative of Bisner's motivation to kill Golub
intentionally—especially given that Bisner mentioned the debt
repeatedly during the night of Golub's death and that he also
told Lyman, "Somebody is going to die tonight." Moreover,
Bisner's prior crime, selling illegal drugs, was quite minor in
relation to the crimes with which he was charged, first degree
felonies of murder and aggravated robbery. See Decorso, 1999 UT
57 at 1 34. The evidence also "did not suggest a proclivity for
violence or even a significant criminal character," as it
reflected only that Bisner had sold Golub $350 in drugs.
Pearson, 943 P.2d at 1351. Indeed, these factors all suggest
that the evidence was not prejudicial in proving Bisner's bad
character, but was relevant to the issues of motive and intent.
Id. at 1351-52; see also State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96
(Utah 1988) (explaining factors that should be considered in
determining whether prior bad act evidence is more probative than
prejudicial). Consequently, we hold that the trial court did net
abuse its discretion in denying Bisner's motion to exclude
evidence of Golub's drug debt to him.
IV.

MANSLAUGHTER JURY INSTRUCTION

560 Bisner next contends that the trial court erred by
giving over his objection jury instruction 25. That instruction,
which related to the necessity of convicting Bisner for
manslaughter rather than murder if he was found to have been
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acting uncer an
pertinent part:

extreme emoticna-. disturcance," state:: in

For manslaughter to apply, the "extreme
emotional disturbance'' must be triggered by
something external to the accused, and his
reaction to such external stimulus must be
reasonable. The terms used must be given the
meaning you would give them in common
everyday use. Such disturbance, therefore,
cannot have been brought about by the
defendant's own peculiar mental processes or
by his own knowing or intentional involvement
in a crime.
Bisner asserts that this instruction "is confusing'' because it
implies that manslaughter excludes "all knowing and intentional
homicides, even when the accused suffers from an extreme
emotional disturbance."
f61 Despite Bisner's argument, we recently upheld a
manslaughter instruction that used language identical to
instruction 25. Unanimously rejecting a challenge that the
instruction at issue erroneously directed "the jury that
manslaughter cannot involve a knowing or intentional mental
state," we held:
[Defendant]'s argument confuses knowledge and
intent in causing the death of the victim
with knowing or intentional involvement in a
crime which in turn brings about an extreme
emotional disturbance. The instruction
merely explains that the manslaughter statute
excludes defendant's intentional involvement
in a crime from the class of circumstances
that can give rise to an extreme emotional
disturbance which mitigates murder to
manslaughter.
State v. Piansiaksone, 954 P.2d 861, 872 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in
original). Given our holding in Piansiaksone, we reiterate today
what we have repeatedly held in the past: that "[t]hose asking
us to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of
persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994).
Indeed, "[t]his burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare
decisis," and to convince us that a previous rule should be
overturned, an appealing party must clearly demonstrate " 'that
the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because
of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No. 20000026

iecar-ir.g :r:~ precedent.'" I^L at 398, 399 'quoting -John Har.r.:
The Pole of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 7111. L. Rev. 3 6"*,
367 ?1957)) . In this case, Bisner's argument that the
manslaughter instruction "is confusing/' which he bolsters with
absolutely no case law, statutory analysis, or other legal

•V.

MERGER

562 Finally, Bisner challenges the trial court's refusal to
merge his convictions for aggravated robbery and murder.
Specifically, Bisner argues that section 76-1-402(3) of the Utah
Code, which states that a "defendant may be convicted of an
offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted
of both the offense charged and the included offense," Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (1999), mandates that we "dismiss, or in the
alterative[,] merge [his] aggravated robbery charge with the
[felony] murder charge." Bisner's argument, however, must fail
for at least two reasons.
163 First, like Bisner's challenge to the manslaughter jury
instruction given in this case, we have already decided the issue
of whether the legislature intended the crime of felony murder to
merge with the underlying felony of aggravated robbery. In State
v. McCovey, we held:
[T]he Utah State Legislature did not intend
the multiple crimes of felony murder to be
punished as a single crime, but rather, that
the homicide be enhanced to second degree
felony murder in addition to the underlying
felony. To conclude otherwise would be to
defeat the deterrent purpose of the felony
murder statute and result in unjust
consequences. A true lesser included
relationship does not exist in the felony
murder statute . . . .
303 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1990). Asserting that McCovev does not
apply to the case now before us, Bisner argues that McCovev "does
not preclude [merger of aggravated robbery and felony murder]
under the appropriate factual circumstances" because our holding
in that case was "based largely on the existence of two separate
victims." However, while we did note in McCovev that the
existence of two different victims was one factor that
distinguished the case factually from prior merger decisions, we
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::: r.zz case cur interpretation of the felony murder statute en
that distinction. Rather, we explicitly premised our holding on
the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. Id.; see also
id. at 1233 [noting that the modern felony murder statute differs
in aim and purpose from the common law doctrine). Likewise,
Eisner's reliance on our earlier decision in State v. Shaffer,
"25 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986), is misplaced. Shaffer dealt with the
merger of aggravated robbery and aggravated murder under Utah
Code section 76-5-202 and is thus inapposite to Bisner's
conviction here for murder under Utah Code section 76-5-203. Id.
at 1313-14.
164 Moreover, unlike McCovey, it is not undisputed in this
case that Bisner was convicted for felony murder. See 803 P.2d
at 1234 ("The fact that McCovey was convicted for second degree
felony murder . . . is undisputed,"). The State charged Bisner
with murder under three alternate theories—that he killed Golub
intentionally or knowingly, that he did so with the intent to
cause serious bodily injury to another, or that he did so while
in the commission of aggravated robbery. Importantly, however,
the State introduced overwhelming evidence at trial that Bisner
killed Golub intentionally or knowingly: Bisner declared just
hours prior to Golub's death that "[s]omebody is going to die
tonight." When Bisner and his friends met Golub at the strip
mall, Bisner assaulted Golub after Koontz and Symes had knocked
him to the ground. Then, even though Bisner's friends withdrew
and urged Bisner to join them, he remained. As this occurred,
Golub, who had been disarmed, fled to his truck and began
speeding away. Despite this fact, Bisner shot at Golub three
times. When he realized his shots missed, Bisner fired three
more rounds, killing Golub. This evidence was sufficient for the
jury to find that Bisner killed Golub intentionally or knowingly.
165 As a result, we hold that, in accordance with our
decision in McCovey, the trial court did not err by denying
Bisner's motion to merge his convictions for aggravated robbery
and murder. 903 P.2d at 1239.
CONCLUSION
166 The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Bisner's motion for a new trial on due process grounds, nor did
it err in admitting into evidence the assault rifle seized from
Bisner's closet. The trial court also acted properly in denying
3isner's motion to exclude evidence of the drug debt Golub owed
him, in instructing the jury concerning manslaughter, and in
refusing to merge Bisner's charges for aggravated robbery and
murder. Accordingly, we affirm Bisner's convictions as entered
below.
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<[67 Chief Justice Howe, Justice Durham, Justice Durrant,
and Justice Wilkins concur in Associate Chief Justice Russcn's
:c:m:n.
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